Speaking Up? - Silence that may kill

Disclaimer! This is NOT an opinion piece, but rather a collection of various readings and clippings which serve to spur further exploration in the topic. These are not full articles but simply excerpts from the bulk of reading material that is available.  As much citation and references were taken with regards to the topic. Legitimacy and accuracy of the clippings are read at your own discretion.
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 Speaking up?
Silence that may kill

Statistics On Speaking Up in Aviation

Bienefeld and Grote (2012) conducted a study to determine the reasons why aircraft crew members sometimes choose to stay silent and not speak up to each other about safety critical information during flight.

Another objective of their study was to understand whether there are specific group differences as to why crew members aren’t speaking up, for example whether the barriers to speaking up are different between Captains and First Officers. The crew groups analyzed were Captain’s, Flight Attendant’s, Purser’s (Chief Flight Attendant) and Flight Attendant’s.

Sample
A total of 1,751 cockpit and cabin crew members of a European Airline participated in the study. Of these 1,751 participants there were 261 Captain's, 334 First Officer's, 307 Purser's and 849 Flight Attendant's studied.

Generalization potential
As this study focused on crew members from one European airline only, Benefeld and Grote note that future research should focus on whether similar results can be found in other airlines around the world with their different cultural contexts. Consequently further study is needed before this study can be generalized to other airlines and crew around the world.

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In their study, Bienefeld and Grote define speaking up as “as an upward voice directed from lower to higher status individuals within and across teams, that challenges the status quo, to avert or mitigate errors” (Bienefeld & Grote, 2012, p.1). As shown in table one, speaking up behavior changed significantly between crew member groups. Members were asked to rate from 0 (never speaking up) to 100 (always speaking up) in how often they spoke up regarding safety critical information.

Table One: Speaking Up Behavior Between Crew Groups
	Mean	SD	Interpretation
Captain	86.93	19.17	Highest Speaking up
First Officer	30.95	22.71	3rd Highest Speaking Up
Purser (Chief Flight Attendant)	28.05	20.35	Lowest Speaking Up
Flight Attendant	57.66	15.17	2nd Highest Speaking Up

The results show that on average all crew members decide not to always speak up regarding issues that are safety related during flight. Interestingly, participant's spoke up only 52% of the time regarding safety critical information overall. The authors used a univariate general linear model to test if past speaking up behavior differed between groups, with each crew group being the independent variable and past speaking up behavior as the dependent variable. Participant's age, gender and and tenure were also included as co-variates. Results were that crew groups had a significant effect in past speaking up behavior (p < .001), however none of the co-variates showed any effects on past speaking up behavior.

When crew members were asked the reasons why they chose to be silent in a certain safety related situation that they remembered, specific group differences emerged as shown in table two.

Table Two: Reasons for Silence versus Frequency (percentage) per Group
Reasons For Silence	Captain	First Officer	Purser	Flight Attendant
1.Status Differences	0%	11%	20%	40% (4th)
2.Fear of Damaging Relationships	53% (1st)	43% (1st)	15%	42% (3rd)
3.Feelings of Futility	0%	33% (2nd)	23% (5th)	51% (2nd)
4.Lack of Experience in current position, job or aircraft type	14% (5th)	13%	3%	0%
5.Negative Impact on Others	24% (2nd)	24% (4th)	16%	36% (5th)
6.Poor Relationship with Supervisor	0%	20%	26% (4th)	35%
7.Fear of Punishment	0%	23% (5th)	67% (2nd)	81% (1st)
8.Fear of Negative Label	3%	29% (3rd)	21%	6%
9.Perceived conflict, efficiency vs safety	21% (3rd)	14%	70% (1st)	29%
10.Perceived Time Pressure	20% (4th)	11%	41% (3rd)	13%
Notes Percentages of Reasons add up to over 100% as most participants had more than one reason for being silent in the situation they remembered. Figures beside percentages indicate the top 5 reasons for each groups silence.

Captains' and First Officers' main reason for silence was the fear of damaging the relationship between one another in the cockpit, with 53% and 43% feeling this way respectively. Further to this, Captain's didn't want to speak up 24% of the time due to the embarrassment they thought the First Officer would feel.

The second highest reason for both First Officer's and Flight Attendant's staying silent was the feeling of futility if they were to speak up, highlighting the decision making positions Captain's and Purser's share.

Flight Attendants' and Pursers' fear of punishment was a major reason for their silence, with 81% and 67% feeling this way respectively. This was contrasted to First Officer's who only gave this as a reason for silence 23% of the time.

Overall the reasons for silence varied greatly, with all groups top 3 reasons for not speaking up being different. (Jose I have emailed you a graph of the table two results).
The authors conducted 10 separate chi-square tests to test if crew groups were different in their reasons for being silent in the situation they remembered. This was achieved through comparing crew groups with their anticipated and viewed frequencies for each reason. All tests gave significant results (p < .001), confirming that a crew members group had a significant effect whether an individual reason for being silent was or was not chosen.

Secure and Insecure Authority

Beyond The Checklist: Suzzane Gordon, Patrick Mendenhall and Bonnie Blair O'Connor
The first officer is afraid to speak up because he doesn't want to make any waves. He doesn't want to get this captain pissed off at him. He's not gonna say anything even though he sees a potential mistake being made.

By Redefining this behavior as "Insecure authority," the aviation safety movement changed the subordinates' view of the behavior of the superior. If in the initial phases of the implementation of CRM this behavior could not be changed, it could still be de-legitimized.

What Johnson says he and his younger colleagues learned was that a good captain will demand that the first officer say something cause he realizes with some humility that everybody makes mistakes and isn't always perfect. The whole idea was for the captain to come on board and give a briefing and say look, if you see anything you don't like, if I'm screwing up, I want you to say something. It's called "Secure Authority"
In our actual training, just demanding participation from the rest of the crew whereas insecure authority is very aristocratic and tries to do everything himself.
 

An Upward Voice
Individual and Contextual Differences

From the Triad Institute Whether in the cockpit or the conference room, study after study shows that people are reluctant to share reservations, concerns, or candid views with their boss. What are they afraid of?
Amy Edmondson of Harvard Business School calls this inhibited upward flow of information in organizations an absence of “upward voice.”
She says two kinds of factors inhibit people’s willingness to speak their mind.

Individual Differences: personality factors like extroversion or pro-activity, communication skillfulness, and personal concerns about repercussions and job security
Contextual Differences: cues about the reaction you’ll get, such as leader behavior, the degree of hierarchy in the organization, and explicit channels for information, such as suggestion boxes, surveys, or regular meetings.

A matter of Cultural Differences
Power Distance Index

Geert Hofstede, a Dutch psychologist, developed the Power Distance Index (PDI) as part of his work to understand and measure certain cultural attributes. Power Distance is concerned with attitudes toward hierarchy – specifically with how much a particular culture values and respects authority.

The greater the PDI, the less likely an employee will disagree with their superior (or someone who has more power).

To determine the PDI, Hofstede conducted cultural surveys in nearly two dozen countries. He asked questions such as:
▪ How frequently, in your experience, does the following problem occur: employees being afraid to express disagreement with their managers or superiors?
▪ To what extent do the less powerful members of the organization accept and expect that power is distributed unequally?
▪ How much are older people respected or feared?
▪ Are power holders entitled to special privileges?

When Hofstede plotted the PDI associated with the pilot’s native country against their respective plane crash rates, he determined there was an association between these two factors. The pilots from countries with the highest Power Distance Index were over 2.5 times more likely to crash than the pilots from countries with the lowest PDI. 

Moreover, plane crashes are much more likely to happen when the captain is in the “flying seat”, even though they share the flying time about equally. Why?

The evidence suggests that the junior officer in the cockpit is reluctant to question the captain (who has more authority) when he or she sees something that may be an unsafe decision. The higher the PDI of the flight crew’s native country, the less likely the co-pilot will be to speak up when something does not seem right. This reticence is believed to be a significant contributor to the higher crash rate. Let’s consider these implications in the context of a non-aviation workplace.

The airline industry made changes to address the identified cultural communication gap. Crew resource management training is now standard in the industry. It is designed to teach junior crew members how to communicate clearly and assertively. There is a standard procedure for co-pilots to challenge the pilot if he/she thinks something has gone wrong or a poor decision is being made. It is a set of escalating statements:
1. “Captain, I’m concerned about…”
2. “Captain, I’m uncomfortable with…”
3. “Captain, I believe the situation is UNSAFE.”
(If the captain does not respond, the first officer is required to take over the aircraft).
Has this training worked?

South Korean people have a high Power Distance Index – and historically pilots from this country suffered a high plane crash rate. Since these changes in crew resource management training, South Korean commercial aviation crash rates are now in line with those countries with a low PDI (see the earlier graphic).

Note that South Korean culture still has a high PDI. But the pilots have been trained to behave quite differently once they enter the cockpit. They are now much more likely to speak up and question the captain if they see or hear something that could jeopardize the safety of the flight.

We could take a page from the crew resource training manual and apply it to an industrial setting. Why not give employees the skills to speak up, using a standard protocol? For example, the procedure for anyone to challenge a co-worker when he/she thinks that person is taking an unnecessary risk could be the following:
1. “_________, I’m concerned about…”
2. “__________, I’m uncomfortable with…”
3. “__________, I believe the situation is unsafe.”
If __________does not respond, the task is stopped.
The Power of One

Just because we educate employees on how to escalate a concern, it does not mean they will have the courage to do so.  We need to appreciate the powerful force of social influence. In this video, David Maxfield and Joseph Grenny explain the power of having just one person in a group speak up in dissent.  They suggest that we express our disagreement using polite doubt.

Leading Change
How can we get employees to speak up when they see risky behavior?  Here are some actions we can take to reduce an organization’s Power Distance Index:

1. Set a clear expectation that everyone (even the most junior employee) is empowered to speak up whenever something doesn’t seem right.
2. Look for opportunities to positively reinforce this behavior when it is observed. Communicate the importance of doing this by citing examples or telling stories of others who spoke up – thus preventing a decision or action that otherwise would have resulted in a negative outcome.
3. Be a role model for how to receive feedback. Publicly praise anyone who voices a concern.  This is especially critical if this person questions a decision or expresses an opinion that is counter to the majority view.
4. Provide training on how to raise and quickly escalate a concern, à la the crew resource training method used by the airline industry.  Standardize the way employees can respectively disagree or pose a question when there is a hierarchy that may inhibit the behavior to speak up. Teach the concept of disagreeing through polite doubt.
5. Enlist opinion leaders in the effort to make “speaking up” an accepted and expected behavior.  These are people who are “respected and connected” in the organization. However, they may not have any formal authority. If you can get this group to speak up, it sends a signal to others that it is an acceptable norm.
6. Facilitate a discussion about this topic in natural work groups.  Have them commit to one another that (a) they will speak up and (b) they will listen when anyone questions a decision or believes that situation is not safe.

We cannot achieve a zero event work place unless we create an environment where employees are watching out for one another.  But simply watching is not enough.  We need everyone to be comfortable enough to take action and speak up when they see anyone taking an unnecessary risk – every time!

Sources:
- Geert Hofstede. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations.  Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, CA. 2001
Robert L. Helmreich and Ashleigh Merritt. “Culture in the Cockpit:  Do Hofstede’s Dimensions Replicate?” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 31, no.3 (May 2000): 283-301.
“Culture May Play Role In Flight Safety — Boeing Study Finds Higher Aviation Accident Rates Among Nations Where Individualism Not The Norm”. Don Phillips. The Washington Post. August 22, 1994.
Ute Fischer and Judith Orasanu.  “Cultural Diversity and Crew Communication.” Astronautical Congress.  Amsterdam. October 1999.
One Simple Skill to Overcome Peer Pressure. https://youtu.be/1-U6QTRTZSc
http://ehstoday.com/safety-leadership/control-or-caring-what-your-motive-safety-conversation

- https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=8aadDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA170&lpg=PA170&dq=beyond+the+checklist+insecure+authority&source=bl&ots=ddaSg74Ok8&sig=cpPmJgLNtwEQenoqKmc4s9eFbBA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj60ej6ouLWAhWLK48KHWTqDeAQ6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=beyond%20the%20checklist%20insecure%20authority&f=false
 - http://triadconsultinggroup.com/sites/default/files/Whitepaper%204%20-%20Talking%20Up.pdf

- http://wikiofscience.wikidot.com/data:silence-that-may-kill-when-aircrew-members-dont-speak-u
- http://continuousmile.com/employees-speak-up-risky-behavior/

1. Bienefeld, Nadine, and Gudela Grote. "Silence that may kill: When aircrew members don’t speak up and why." Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors 2.1 (2012): 1.

2. Milliken, F. J., Morrison, E. W., & Hewlin, P. F. (2003). An exploratory study of employee silence: Issues that employees don’t communicate upward and why. Journal of Manage- ment Studies, 40(6), 1453–1476

2. Detert, J. R., & Burris, E. R. (2007). Leadership behavior and employee voice: Is the door really open? Academy of Management Journal, 50, 869–884
Images from:
https://isys6621.com/2014/11/13/why-we-behave-differently-in-social-media/
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/opinion/speaking-up-for-the-public-phd-viva

http://yashimdauji.blogspot.sg/2012/11/test-pilots.html