At the get go, the place was understaffed. The Topping up of drinks was slow to come by and the usual warm bread served table side was only available after a reminder. When queried on the menu, there lacked any real 'sales' or enthusiasm for any particular dish.
Ordered On: 30Nov2017
Aguacate con cangrejo SGD15 Crab Scallop dip served with toasties
*Visually it looked like it taste. An absolutely waste of time. Vegetable was not dressed and toasties were more like crostini straight out of a bag. Arguably the crab scallop puree was passable at best.* Rollitos de Esparragos y Bricon SGD12 Asparagus rolled in bacon
*Simple but too salty by fact of the bacon. It could have done well using large sweet asparagus, instead of the cheaper baby asparagus alternative. One can have better at any yakitori.* Gulas SGD13 Mock Angulas (baby eel) *Simple. Garlic, olive oil and dry chilli with the smooth eel. Good flavor and texture. Its like having noodles with the fragrant fry.* Rabo de Toro SGD16 Ox Tail Stew *Nice and meat falls right off the bone. A pretty good portion for two to share.* Seafood Paella Valeciana *Their signature dish. Made to order which as a disclaimer on their menu takes about 40mins to make. It is a little on the salty side, but having a pretty respectable amount of ingredients was a plus. Good flavor, but the char bits may or may not be part of it. Half of the base pan was charred and tasted like clay-pot rice.* SGD104.80 fed 2 Ambiance 3/5 Service 3/5 Food 3/5 Value 2.5/5
Won't be returning. Perhaps their two day advance orders like the suckling pig and chicken are worth a visit in a large group, but for those ordered it wasn't that interesting. The tapas selection had were relatively normal and their mains were pretty alright. We didn't even bother to stay for the dessert, instead went down the road from there to have Durains at Dempsey durians (83m away)
Disclaimer! This
is NOT an opinion piece, but rather a collection of various readings
and clippings which
serve to spur further exploration in the topic. These are not full
articles but simply excerpts from the bulk of reading material that is
available. As much
citation and references were taken with regards to the topic. Legitimacy
and
accuracy of the clippings are read at your own discretion.
At the time of this video in 1997, 68% of airline accidents involved
“automation dependency.” Savvy airline training programs were actively
discouraging airline crews from becoming “automation managers.”
Subsequently many high visibility accidents like Air France 447 and Asiana Airlines flight 214
(the “seawall approach” at San Francisco) have proved the disabling
effect of automation. Now we are experiencing this same phenomenon in
smaller planes as the technology propagates downward into piston planes.
Increasingly the evils of “task saturation,” “loss situational
awareness,” and “deterioration of hand-flying” are implicated in
deviations or accidents.
One
antidote is careful monitoring by the pilot or crew to detect either
task saturation from automation dependency, loss of situational
awareness or just confusion about the operation of the flight management
system in general (“what’s it doing now…?”).
The necessary action is to
step down a level of automation or take over the flight manually. For
this reason it is imperative that every pilot maintains confident hand
flying skills to fly accurately and improve the outcome of any flight.
Pilots and crews that lack hand flying skills and/or confidence are
increasingly involved in accidents. The FAA has issued a SAFO (Safety
Alert For Operators) on the importance of hand flying citing an “increase in manual handling errors”. The new FAA Advisory Circular on flight reviews
advises flight instructors to watch for automation dependency and weak
hand flying skills during flight reviews.
Similarly every pilot must
monitor and correct their own automation dependency. It is incumbent
upon the careful pilot to maintain and sharpen their hand flying skills
with regular practice or dual flight. “George” usually does a great job
flying (embarrassing too !) but please remember to turn off the magic, take a turn flying and stay sharp!
Disclaimer! This
is NOT an opinion piece, but rather a collection of various readings
and clippings which
serve to spur further exploration in the topic. These are not full
articles but simply excerpts from the bulk of reading material that is
available. As much
citation and references were taken with regards to the topic. Legitimacy
and
accuracy of the clippings are read at your own discretion.
In Outliers,
Malcolm Gladwell discusses what linguists call “mitigated speech.”
Mitigated speech is when we speak in a deferential way in order to be
polite or show deference to authority. For example, “If you want your boss to do you a favor, you don’t say,
‘I’ll need this by Monday.’ You mitigate. You say, ‘Don’t bother if
it’s too much trouble, but if you have a chance to look at this over the
weekend, that would be wonderful.'” In most situations, mitigation is a very good and polite thing. But
there are some situations where it creates a problem. The cockpit of an
airplane on a stormy night is one such instance.
6 Levels of Mitigation in Speech
Gladwell points out that there are six ways for a first officer to
persuade a captain to change course. These reflect the six levels of
mitigation in speech:
1. Command: “Turn thirty degrees right.” That’s the most direct and explicit way of making a point imaginable. It’s zero mitigation. 2. Crew Obligation Statement: “I think we need to deviate
right about now.” Notice the use of “we” and the fact that the request
is now much less specific. It’s a little softer. 3. Crew Suggestion: “Let’s go around the weather.” Implicit in that statement is “we’re in this together.” 4. Query: “Which direction would you like to deviate?”
That’s even softer than a crew suggestion, because the speaker is
conceding that he’s not in charge. 5. Preference: “I think it would be wise to turn left or right.” 6. Hint: “That return at twenty-five miles looks mean.” This is the most mitigated statement of all. (Outliers, p 195)
These six levels of mitigation are helpful. Mitigation is a good way
to show courtesy and respect to others. Teaching mitigation is even a
key part of raising kids. For example, we teach our children not to say
to us “Give me some orange juice.” They need to say, “Please may I have
some orange juice?” So it is good manners to use mitigation in our communication, and this seems to come naturally to most people. But sometimes this can get tricky. There are times to use less
mitigation than others. For example, I don’t like it when people give me
hints. As Gladwell says so well, “a hint is the hardest kind of request
to decode and the easiest to refuse.” A lot of times, if someone is
giving a hint about a course of action to take, it is too easy to
interpret them as simply making an observation. Not until after the fact
do I realize, “Oh, they really mean that I should have turned left
there.”
Mitigation maybe unclear and may not be picked upon in compressed time!
The worst example of all comes in situations where lives are at risk
and clear, decisive actions need to be taken. Those are instances where
mitigation creates problems.
Why? The reason is mitigation. The first officer wants to show deference
to the authority of the pilot. So if the pilot is making a mistake, he
mitigates. If things have gone wrong, the captain is low on sleep, and
other complexities abound, the captain can fail to pick this up and
decode the fact that the first officer is actually saying that a
critical action needs to be taken.
Gladwell gives several instances of
how this became the decisive issue in commercial airline crashes. As a
result, it is ironically the case that “planes are safer when the least
experienced person is flying, because it means the second pilot isn’t
going to be afraid to speak up” (p. 197).
Fortunately, in recent years “combating mitigation has become one of
the great crusades in commercial aviation in the past fifteen years.”
Crew members are taught how to communicate clearly and assertively and a
standardized procedure to challenge the pilot if it appears that he or
she has overlooked something critical.
The result? “Aviation experts will tell you that it is the success of
this war on mitigation as much as anything else that accounts for the
extraordinary decline in airline accidents in recent years.”
The lesson? The way we communicate matters. Be respectful and be
polite. That is crucial to preserving the human element of our
interactions. But know when times call for increased directness, and how
to be tactful in spite of having to use less mitigation. And, above
all, be clear.
You maybe interested in - Speaking Up? - Silence that may kill References: https://www.whatsbestnext.com/2009/06/mitigated-speech-and-plane-crashes/ Images: http://it.toolbox.com/blogs/strategic-project-management/projectbased-work-and-mitigated-speech-dont-39592 https://www.dallasnews.com/life/healthy-living/2016/05/22/the-antidote-to-an-overloaded-brain
*Apart from the fries and toasted pita bread, the rest of the meal is average. Like realllly average. Though the meat serving is huge, the meat on its own is relatively salty, minimal fat and lacking flavor. The house chilli is a little special. Pretty spicy but when we had it, some of us found the chilli batch a little sour. Halal guys probably have the way spicier chilli and flavorful meats. So far the top shawarma with spit fire char, recommended by others and voted best city eats is located in Auckland, The Middle East Cafe.
Fed each at about 100Kroners each. The beers were cheap at about 18Kroners and worth the change out from soft drinks.
The place has a Marche kinda of concept, with a truly international range of eats ranging from Brazilian, Thai, Japanese, French, Italian, Korean, Indian and much much more. The decor is pretty Hipsterish and similar to container box dining. London's Camden Town and Borough's Market offer a very similar experience, great for sharing and hang for a bit.
Ordered On:
13Nov2017
Duck Confit with Duck Fat Fried Fries 110Kroner *Duck Confit pictured center* *The duck fat fried fries were really good on their own, but the heavy seasoning of the salt threw the taste off. The duck confit itself was one of the better ones had. Not too dried out and enjoyable.*
Korean Fried Chicken *Nice crispy juicy chicken, but the batter looked strangely more yellow than the usual golden brown. Their sweet chili sauce however was spicy and great with the eats.* Burger 90Kroner *Average and boring. The meat patty felt over worked and under cooked.* 'Prata' Bread wrapped in mix of beef pork, cheese and avocados 120Kroner *Way better than similar dish had at Chili Shawarama had above. The additional add ons of Cheese, avocado and flavorful meats really steeped it up a notch.* Fed 11 total
$$$On average meals go for about 90-110Kroners depending on your order. Beer starts from 30Kroners to about 55Kroners range$$$
A nice setting, with indoor heating which is cozy during the colder periods. There's outdoor sitting available as well which one can imagine is lovely during spring time. Best part is that some of the stalls offer free samplings to help you make a better decision. Good selection but can't speak for the overall hits or misses as there were too many to choose form.
Disclaimer! This
is NOT an opinion piece, but rather a collection of various readings
and clippings which
serve to spur further exploration in the topic. These are not full
articles but simply excerpts from the bulk of reading material that is
available. As much
citation and references were taken with regards to the topic. Legitimacy
and
accuracy of the clippings are read at your own discretion.
ABSTRACT In this article the authority system in the airplane cockpit is related to thirty year old authority studies of Stanley Milgram. Human errors made in the cockpit are found similar to those made in the authority experiments. It is argued that up to 20% of all airplane accidents may be preventable by optimizing the monitoring and challenging (M&C) of captain errors by the first officer.
INTRODUCTION In a hierarchical organization, the boss's authority in the work function can be more or less absolute. In 1963, the eminent social psychologist Stanley Milgram measured the strength of the United States society authority. He found that it was about much stronger than expected - a psychology experimenter was able to make subjects carry out orders that led to the simulated injury and death of a confederate.
Such strong authority tends to create situations in which errors made by authorities will not be corrected. In particular, this is the case in the airplane cockpit: a disproportionate number of accidents occur with the captain flying erroneously and the first officer failing to monitor and challenge the captain errors.
We make the case that any lack of monitoring and challenging of the captain by the first officer is due to the already well documented difficulty of monitoring and challenging authority in our society. The Milgram experiments are described briefly, specific connections between the experiment and the authority structure in the airplane cockpits are made and using this frame work an accident is analyzed more closely using a cockpit voice recording.
Aviation organizational norms include the individualistic thinking from the historical period of the single-pilot planes. This tradition devalues the first officer. Thus, the institution of the first officer is "not fully developed," and the latter plays a "distinctly secondary role".
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FINDINGS: THE DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING STRONG AUTHORITY
Excessively obedient behavior in the presence of authority was found in the psychology laboratory by Stanley Milgram over thirty-five years ago (Milgram, 1974). In these experiments, a subject, the teacher, is asked by the experimenter to give electrical shocks to a confederate, the learner. The stated purpose of the experiment is to understand how punishment affects memory recall. The learner first fakes discomfort and as the fake electrical shocks increase to dangerous levels, he suddenly becomes quiet.
There are four of Milgram’s findings that can help shed light on inadequate monitoring and challenging in the airplane cockpit:
1. Excessive Obedience: Milgram found that most people can be made to inflict intense pain and even kill the learner. 2. Hesitant Challenging: The teacher’s objections to giving the learner electrical shocks were often hesitant and easily overruled by the experimenter’s replies, such as telling the teacher that “the experiment requires that you continue.” 3. Lack of Monitoring: The teacher accepts the authority’s definition of the situation, which does not include the choice of disobedience but only the necessity of continued obedience. Indeed, in the Milgram experiment not one out of almost a thousand teacher-subjects came up with an interpretation leading them to call the police or free the learner (Zimbardo, 1974). 4. Physical Closeness Matters: The strength of the authority of the experimenter was found to be higher the closer the teacher was to the experimenter. In addition, there is the Milgram Prediction Error: It was shown that predictions (done by psychiatrists, graduate students and faculty in the behavioral sciences, college sophomores, and middle-class adults) underestimate the rate of obedience to authority by a factor of a hundred (Milgram, 1974)! This Milgram Prediction Error, which remains the same, keeps organizations from addressing the issue of how to protect against erroneous authority.
THE DIFFICULTY OF CHALLENGING AN ERRONEOUS CAPTAIN
Experimenter = Erroneous Captain Teacher = Co-Pilot/First Officer Patient = Everyone else in the airplane. Passengers There are similarities between the Milgram experimental situation and the behavior in the cockpit during distress. We make a simple correspondence between the Milgram experiment and the cockpit dynamics: the role of the experimenter is taken by the erroneous captain, the teacher is the first officer, and the harm to the learner and everybody else is the airplane crashing.
Observers of behavior in the aviation field have noted the tendency of the captain-first officer relationship to be too authoritarian in many instances. Ginnett (1993) writes about the tendency of the first officer not to question the captain (here, and later in other examples, I have inserted the applicable findings of Milgram, mentioned above, in square brackets): The authority dynamic surrounding the role of the captain must be extremely powerful. . . . [and] has resulted in crew members not speaking up when necessary [Hesitant Challenging]. . . . This inclination may also result in excessive psychological dependence on the captain as leader to the extent that individual contributions to problem-solving are neither voiced not attempted [Lack of Monitoring].
Lack of Monitoring and Challenging most common cause in 80% of the accident sample
DOING THE NUMBERS: MONITORING AND CHALLENGING ERRORS In 1994 the NTSB (1994b) reviewed all serious airplane accidents between 1978 and 1990. The NTSB found that after procedural errors, errors of the type “monitoring/challenging” were the most common, occurring in 80 % of the accident sample. These were errors in which the non-flying crew-member (the first officer in 81-87% of the cases) did not properly monitor and challenge the flying crew-member when errors were committed. Usually the errors that should have been monitored or challenged were listed as causal or contributing to the accident.
Using this data we can calculate how many accidents are related to inadequate monitoring and challenging. According to the NTSB in 19 of the 37 accidents a monitoring/challenging error followed a causal error. Since the initial pool consisted of 75 accidents, approximately 25% of all accidents could have been prevented by better monitoring and challenging.Keeping in mind that in 81-87% of all the accidents the captain was the flying pilot, about 20% of all accidents could have been prevented if the first officer had better monitored and challenged the captain.
The study recognized that a common factor in accidents was a tactical error by the
Pilot flying thathad not been effectively challenged by the PNF, and
that this was is proportionately far more common when the Captain was
the PF. It also referred to NASA's 1979 full mission simulations, which documented that sound decision-making is more difficult for the Captain when he also acting as PF.
In
discussing tactical errors, the 1994 study noted that when a course of
action needs to be modified, "a captain/flying pilot must first
perceive a need to change, then must alter his or her own current plan
and behavior. The decision to change a course of action may be inhibited
by overconfidence in ability or the earlier decision to engage in the
ongoing course of action. These dynamics probably were relevant in eight
accidents involving a failure to execute a go-around during
unstabilised approaches." The study
continued, "The tactical decision/errors of omission may be particularly
difficult to catch, especially for first officers. In monitoring and
challenging a captain's tactical decision error, a first officer may
have difficulty both in deciding that the captain has made a faulty
decision, and in choosing the correct time to question the decision. A
first officer may be concerned that a challenge to a decision may be
perceived as a direct challenge to the captain's authority.
For
example, challenging a captain's failure to execute a go-around may be
much more difficult for a first officer to do, in a timely fashion, than
challenging a straightforward procedural error whose correction is
unarguable, such as failure to turn on a transponder prior to takeoff.
The absence
of action (error of omission) may not call attention to itself as an
error as readily as an error of commission. Also, in many situations
there may be a period of seconds or minutes when action could be taken.
Thus, there may be no distinct signal or cue that now is the time to
speak up about another crew member's failure to act, and a challenge may
be deferred in hope that the error will be corrected soon."
A 2010
NASA study (Dismukes and Berman) points out the continuation of this
problem. Its discussion of "deviation trapping" notes that "Captains
in the monitoring pilot role were more than twice as likely to trap
deviations made by the flying pilot than first officers in the
monitoring pilot role (27.9% vs. 12.1%). This is consistent with [other quoted]
flight simulation research showing that captains were more likely to
challenge first officers flying the aircraft than vice versa".
Although
these studies do not specifically use the phrase, this is what is now
commonly called the "cross-cockpit authority gradient". The NTSB made
extensive and detailed recommendations about training the need for
extensive Crew Resource Management training to overcome these problems
which it clearly considered to be one of the most fundamental issues
affecting airline safety. Sources: https://mafiadoc.com/applications-of-the-milgram-experiments-authority-field-cogprints_59d4628e1723dd5b7569f98e.html http://picma.info/?q=content/monitoring-and-challenging-failures Birnbach, R., & Longridge, T. (1993). The regulatory perspective. In E. Wiener, B. Kanki, & R. Helmreich (Eds.), Cockpit resource management. (pp. 263-281). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Bryant, A. (1994, Nov. 19). Chastened, T.W.A. tries again; business plan built on hope is revised. New York Times, p. 17N. EDWARDS, E. (1975, October). "Stress and the Airline Pilot." Paper presented at British Airline Pilots Association Medical Symposium, London. Ginnett, R. (1993). Crews as groups: Their formation and their leadership. In E. Wiener, B. Kanki, and R. Helmreich (Eds.), Cockpit resource management. (pp 71-98). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Helmreich, R., & Foushee, H. (1993). Why crew resource management? Empirical and theoretical bases of human factors training in aviation. In E. Wiener, B. Kanki, & R. Helmreich (Eds.), Cockpit resource management. (pp 3-45). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Merritt, A., & Helmreich, R. (1996). Human factors on the flight deck: The influence of national culture. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27, 5-24. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority: An experimental view. New York: Harper and Row. National Transportation Safety Board (1994a). Controlled collision with terrain: Northwest Airlink Flight 5719, Hibbing, Minnesota, December 1, 1993. Washington, DC. National Transportation Safety Board (1994b). A review of flightcrew-involved major accidents of U.S. air carriers, 1978 through 1990. Washington, DC. 17 Wiener,E., Kanki, B., & Helmreich, R. (1993). Cockpit resource management. San Diego: Academic Press, Inc. Zimbardo, P. G. (1974). On “Obedience to Authority.” American Psychologist, 29, 566-567. 18 APPENDIX I The following checklist is derived from Normal Procedures, Aircraft Operating Manual - DC-9 revision 10 (9/4/95). Additions made by this author are indicated in italics. Image Sources: https://www.elephantjournal.com/2011/10/the-spirituality-of-cheeseburgers/ http://picma.info/?q=content/monitoring-and-challenging-failures https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140217220032-266437464-asiana-airlines-sorry-captain-you-re-wrong
*Visually it looked like it taste. An absolutely waste of time. Vegetable was not dressed and toasties were more like crostini straight out of a bag. Arguably the crab scallop puree was passable at best.*
*Simple but too salty by fact of the bacon. It could have done well using large sweet asparagus, instead of the cheaper baby asparagus alternative. One can have better at any yakitori.*
